Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Bayesian Stackelberg Markov Games for Adaptive Moving Target Defense
Sailik Sengupta and Subbarao Kambhampati · arXiv preprint
This paper models adaptive moving target defense as a Bayesian Stackelberg Markov game with incomplete information about strategic attackers.
Markovian Persuasion
Ehud Lehrer and Dimitry Shaiderman · arXiv preprint
This paper studies Bayesian persuasion when the state of nature evolves according to a Markov process.
Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg Games
Jiarui Gan, Haifeng Xu, Qingyu Guo, Long Tran-Thanh, Zinovi Rabinovich, and Michael Wooldridge · ACM EC
This paper examines how a strategic follower can imitate another type and manipulate a leader that is learning from observed responses.
Learning in Bayesian Stackelberg Games With Unknown Follower’s Types
Matteo Bollini, Francesco Bacchiocchi, Samuel Coutts, Matteo Castiglioni, and Alberto Marchesi · arXiv preprint
This paper studies online learning in Bayesian Stackelberg games when the leader initially knows neither follower payoffs nor the distribution over follower types.
Decoding the Imitation Security Game: Handling Attacker Imitative Behavior Deception
Thanh H. Nguyen, Nam Vu, Amulya Yadav, and Uy Nguyen · ECAI
This paper studies attackers that manipulate historical data by imitating a behavioural model, causing a defender to learn an ineffective strategy.
Manipulating a Learning Defender and Ways to Counteract
Jiarui Gan, Qingyu Guo, Long Tran-Thanh, Bo An, and Michael Wooldridge · NeurIPS
This paper shows how an attacker can manipulate a defender that learns payoff information from observed best responses.
Partial Adversarial Behavior Deception in Security Games
Thanh H. Nguyen, Arunesh Sinha, and He He · Conference paper
This paper considers a population of attackers in which only part of the observed behaviour is controlled by a deceptive adversary.
Online Bayesian Persuasion Without a Clue
Francesco Bacchiocchi, Matteo Bollini, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, and Nicola Gatti · NeurIPS
This paper studies repeated Bayesian persuasion when the sender knows neither the prior over states nor the receiver’s utilities.
Bayesian Persuasion with Externalities: Exploiting Agent Types
Jonathan Shaki, Jiarui Gan, and Sarit Kraus · AAAI
This paper examines how a principal can inform and coordinate multiple agents whose utilities depend on one another’s actions.
Online Bayesian Persuasion
Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Alberto Marchesi, and Nicola Gatti · NeurIPS
This paper studies repeated persuasion against receivers whose unknown types may be selected adversarially over time.
Inverse Game Theory for Stackelberg Games: The Blessing of Bounded Rationality
Jibang Wu, Weiran Shen, Fei Fang, and Haifeng Xu · NeurIPS
This paper studies how a leader can infer unknown follower utilities from observed behavior in Stackelberg games.
Actions Speak What You Want: Provably Sample-Efficient Reinforcement Learning of the Quantal Stackelberg Equilibrium from Strategic Feedbacks
Siyu Chen, Mengdi Wang, and Zhuoran Yang · arXiv preprint
This paper considers learning a quantal Stackelberg equilibrium in episodic leader-follower Markov games from follower actions.
Choices Are Not Independent: Stackelberg Security Games with Nested Quantal Response Models
Tien Mai and Arunesh Sinha · AAAI
This paper extends quantal-response security games to represent correlations among an attacker’s choices through a nested decision model.
Combinatorial Multi-Armed Bandit with General Reward Functions
Wei Chen, Wei Hu, Fu Li, Jian Li, Yu Liu, and Pinyan Lu · NeurIPS
This paper generalizes combinatorial bandits to nonlinear rewards that may depend on complete outcome distributions rather than only their means.
Contextual Bandits with Large Action Spaces: Made Practical
Yinglun Zhu, Dylan J. Foster, John Langford, and Paul Mineiro · arXiv preprint
This paper develops practical contextual-bandit algorithms for large or continuous linearly structured action spaces.
Global Rewards in Restless Multi-Armed Bandits
Naveen Raman, Zheyuan Ryan Shi, and Fei Fang · arXiv preprint
This paper extends restless multi-armed bandits to objectives with global, non-separable rewards across selected arms.
X-Armed Bandits
Sébastien Bubeck, Rémi Munos, Gilles Stoltz, and Csaba Szepesvári · Journal of Machine Learning Research
This paper studies stochastic bandits over general measurable action spaces with local smoothness expressed through a known dissimilarity function.
Non-Stationary Lipschitz Bandits
Nicolas Nguyen, Solenne Gaucher, and Claire Vernade · NeurIPS
This paper studies continuous-action Lipschitz bandits whose reward functions may change arbitrarily over time.
PyXAB: A Python Library for X-Armed Bandit and Online Blackbox Optimization Algorithms
Wenjie Li, Haoze Li, Jean Honorio, and Qifan Song · arXiv preprint
This paper presents PyXAB, an open-source Python library for X-armed bandit and online black-box optimization algorithms.
Transition-Informed Reinforcement Learning for Large-Scale Stackelberg Mean-Field Games
Pengdeng Li, Runsheng Yu, Xinrun Wang, and Bo An · AAAI
This paper studies how a leader can learn incentives for very large populations of homogeneous, self-interested followers.
Uncoupled Learning of Differential Stackelberg Equilibria with Commitments
Robert Loftin, Mustafa Mert Çelikok, Herke van Hoof, Samuel Kaski, and Frans A. Oliehoek · AAMAS
This paper develops decentralized learning dynamics for differential Stackelberg equilibria when agents cannot access one another’s payoff functions.
Playing Repeated Stochastic Security Games Against Non-Stationary Attackers
Ling Chen and Runfa Zhang · Mathematics
This paper studies repeated security games where an attacker’s latent behavior type changes stochastically and without notification.