Independent Reading · 2021

Partial Adversarial Behavior Deception in Security Games

Thanh H. Nguyen, Arunesh Sinha, and He He · Conference paper

Security GamesBehavioral ModellingAdversarial Learning

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Paper Information

Authors
Thanh H. Nguyen, Arunesh Sinha, and He He
Venue
Conference paper · 2021
Open official paper

Summary

This paper considers a population of attackers in which only part of the observed behaviour is controlled by a deceptive adversary.

Core Idea

Even limited control over training data can distort a learned attacker model and reduce the effectiveness of a defender’s strategy.

Method

The paper introduces a partial behavior deception model and the GAMBO gradient-based algorithm for computing deceptive attack strategies.

Key Takeaways

  • A single deceptive participant can influence a model learned from a broader population.
  • Partial manipulation can produce meaningful attacker gains and defender losses.
  • Security learning systems need safeguards against strategically contaminated data.

Questions

  • How much deceptive data is required before a defender’s model becomes unreliable?
  • Can robust estimation reduce the impact of partial behavioural manipulation?