Independent Reading · 2022

Inverse Game Theory for Stackelberg Games: The Blessing of Bounded Rationality

Jibang Wu, Weiran Shen, Fei Fang, and Haifeng Xu · NeurIPS

Stackelberg GamesInverse Game TheoryBounded Rationality

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Paper Information

Authors
Jibang Wu, Weiran Shen, Fei Fang, and Haifeng Xu
Venue
NeurIPS · 2022
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Summary

This paper studies how a leader can infer unknown follower utilities from observed behavior in Stackelberg games.

Core Idea

Quantal-response behavior can reveal more information than perfectly rational best responses because every action may be observed with positive probability.

Method

The authors derive learning guarantees under quantal response and support the theory with experiments on synthetic games and model misspecification.

Key Takeaways

  • Bounded rationality can improve identifiability in inverse strategic problems.
  • Smooth behavioral responses provide richer information about latent utilities.
  • Behavioral assumptions affect both prediction quality and sample efficiency.

Questions

  • How can the rationality parameter be estimated jointly with follower utilities?
  • Do the benefits persist under non-logit behavioral models?