Independent Reading · 2020
Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Bayesian Stackelberg Markov Games for Adaptive Moving Target Defense
Sailik Sengupta and Subbarao Kambhampati · arXiv preprint
Stackelberg GamesReinforcement LearningAI Security
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Paper Information
- Authors
- Sailik Sengupta and Subbarao Kambhampati
- Venue
- arXiv preprint · 2020
Summary
This paper models adaptive moving target defense as a Bayesian Stackelberg Markov game with incomplete information about strategic attackers.
Core Idea
Combine a sequential leader-follower security model with multi-agent reinforcement learning so a defender can learn movement policies without a complete reward or transition model.
Method
The authors introduce Bayesian Strong Stackelberg Q-learning and study its convergence to a Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium in the proposed game model.
Key Takeaways
- Sequential security decisions require both strategic reasoning and adaptation over time.
- Incomplete information about attacker types can materially change defensive policies.
- Game-theoretic structure can be incorporated into reinforcement-learning algorithms.
Questions
- How sensitive are learned defense policies to inaccurate assumptions about attacker types?
- How does the approach scale as the number of system configurations and attacker models grows?