Independent Reading · 2025

Bayesian Persuasion with Externalities: Exploiting Agent Types

Jonathan Shaki, Jiarui Gan, and Sarit Kraus · AAAI

Bayesian PersuasionExternalitiesMulti-Agent Systems

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Paper Information

Authors
Jonathan Shaki, Jiarui Gan, and Sarit Kraus
Venue
AAAI · 2025
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Summary

This paper examines how a principal can inform and coordinate multiple agents whose utilities depend on one another’s actions.

Core Idea

Grouping agents into a small number of types provides a compact structure for persuasion problems that also involve coordination externalities.

Method

The paper characterizes public, private, and semi-private signaling schemes, gives linear-program formulations, and establishes tractability and hardness results.

Key Takeaways

  • Persuasion with externalities combines information disclosure and action coordination.
  • Agent types can make otherwise exponential joint-action descriptions manageable.
  • Optimal computation is polynomial in bounded-deviation settings but becomes NP-hard more generally.

Questions

  • How sensitive are optimal signals to errors in the assumed agent-type model?
  • What approximation methods work well when many agents may deviate?