Independent Reading · 2021
Markovian Persuasion
Ehud Lehrer and Dimitry Shaiderman · arXiv preprint
Bayesian PersuasionGame TheorySequential Decision-Making
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Paper Information
- Authors
- Ehud Lehrer and Dimitry Shaiderman
- Venue
- arXiv preprint · 2021
Summary
This paper studies Bayesian persuasion when the state of nature evolves according to a Markov process.
Core Idea
An informed sender must balance immediate gains from information disclosure against the effect of current signals on future receiver beliefs and payoffs.
Method
The paper analyses optimal disclosure strategies under different discount factors and characterises conditions for attaining the maximal asymptotic value.
Key Takeaways
- Information disclosure has intertemporal consequences in dynamic environments.
- Belief evolution depends jointly on signalling and the underlying Markov transition law.
- Optimal persuasion may require sacrificing short-term payoff to influence future beliefs.
Questions
- How do optimal policies change when state transitions are only partially known?
- What happens when the receiver also learns or adapts strategically over time?