Independent Reading · 2024
Online Bayesian Persuasion Without a Clue
Francesco Bacchiocchi, Matteo Bollini, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, and Nicola Gatti · NeurIPS
Bayesian PersuasionOnline LearningIncomplete Information
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Paper Information
- Authors
- Francesco Bacchiocchi, Matteo Bollini, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, and Nicola Gatti
- Venue
- NeurIPS · 2024
Summary
This paper studies repeated Bayesian persuasion when the sender knows neither the prior over states nor the receiver’s utilities.
Core Idea
A sender can learn effective signaling schemes from receiver responses even without an initial model of the surrounding environment.
Method
The authors develop an explore-then-commit algorithm over a non-standard representation of signaling schemes and prove matching regret and sample-complexity bounds.
Key Takeaways
- Strategic information design can be learned under severe model uncertainty.
- Receiver best-response feedback can reveal useful structure about unknown preferences.
- The representation of signaling schemes is central to obtaining tight learning guarantees.
Questions
- How robust is the method when receiver behavior is noisy rather than exactly optimal?
- Can the approach adapt when the prior or receiver utilities change over time?