Independent Reading · 2019

Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg Games

Jiarui Gan, Haifeng Xu, Qingyu Guo, Long Tran-Thanh, Zinovi Rabinovich, and Michael Wooldridge · ACM EC

Stackelberg GamesDeceptionAlgorithmic Game Theory

Paper Information

Authors
Jiarui Gan, Haifeng Xu, Qingyu Guo, Long Tran-Thanh, Zinovi Rabinovich, and Michael Wooldridge
Venue
ACM EC · 2019
Open official paper

Summary

This paper examines how a strategic follower can imitate another type and manipulate a leader that is learning from observed responses.

Core Idea

Follower behaviour should not automatically be treated as truthful evidence about underlying preferences or payoffs.

Method

The authors formalise imitative follower deception, analyse the computational complexity of optimal leader policies, and evaluate deception-aware strategies in simulation.

Key Takeaways

  • Information asymmetry can create incentives for strategic misrepresentation.
  • Learning a follower model is harder when observations are deliberately manipulated.
  • Deception-aware policies can reduce the leader’s loss, but may be computationally difficult to obtain.

Questions

  • Which observable signals help distinguish genuine behaviour from imitation?
  • How can deception-aware policies remain effective when the follower type space is incomplete?